1–101) God and Creation (1–45) Intellectual Substance (46–55) Intellectual Substance and Body (56–90) As far as this point is concerned, it makes n difference whether the being tending to an end is a knowing being or not. So, His providence applies to all singulars immediately. [1] Now, from these conclusions it becomes evident that divine providence, whereby He governs things, does not prevent corruption, deficiency, and evil from being found in things. But this is false, for it has been shown that every agent tends toward the good. But every application of power to operation is originally and primarily made by God. Now, it is clear from what has been said that man cannot understand separate substances on the basis of the foregoing opinions. [5] Besides, in any order, “that which exists through itself is prior to, and is the principle of, that which is through another.” So, that which is known through itself is known before all things that are known through another, and it is the principle of the knowing of them. So, that knowledge of God which, when acquired, leaves no knowledge of a knowable object to be desired is essentially this felicity. Therefore, the agent’s desire must be directed to some definite thing. And, if this power were ever to cease its ruling of the things which have been created, their species would at once come to an end, and all nature would collapse. But the occurrence of evil is not called fortuitous, a matter of chance, nor does it happen rarely, but always or in most cases. For, our intellect in our present state understands nothing without a phantasm, and the phantasm is related to the possible intellect, whereby we understand, as colors are related to vision, as is evident from what we have treated in Book Two. THAT GOD GOVERNS THINGS BY HIS PROVIDENCE [5] Moreover, evil acts only through the power of the good, as is clear from what has been established previously. [2] Hence, since some men have claimed that man’s ultimate end is in this life, because they know separate substances, we must consider whether man can know separate substances in this life. For instance, one approaches closer to a proper knowledge of man when he knows that he is neither an inanimate, nor an insensitive, being than when one merely knows that he is not inanimate; even though neither of them makes it known what man is. Now, the human intellect has a greater desire, and love, and pleasure, in knowing divine matters than it has in the perfect knowledge of the lowest things, even though it can grasp but little concerning divine things. [3] Again, if God does not exercise providence over these singulars, this is either because He does not know them, or because He is not able to do so, or because He does not wish to take care of them. Of course, the form, by virtue of which the thing exists, is its first perfection, as is evident from Book II of On the Soul [1: 412a 28]. Hence, its function is solely to undergo, and not to perform, action. Therefore, unless along with felicity such an unmoving stability be attained, he is not yet happy, for his natural desire is not yet at rest. Therefore, its action, as joined to higher things which exist above time, participates in eternity. And so, singulars come no more under the scope of divine providence in regard to their preservation in being than they do in regard to their other aspects. So, that whereby man is made most like God will be his felicity. Indeed, forms and accidents cannot come into being from matter, since they do not have matter as one of their parts. [13] Now, by this conclusion the error of the ancient philosophers of nature is refuted, for they said that all things come about as a result of material necessity, the consequence of which would be that all things happen by chance and not from the order of providence. For, there is needed for the perfection of contemplation a soundness of body, to which all the products of art that are necessary for life are directed. Therefore, the highest good for man does not lie in riches. Therefore, their natural desire tends toward the understanding of divine substance. However, the motion of an animated body, in which it is moved by a soul, is not violent for it as an animal, though it is violent for it as a heavy object. But the highest good is not relative to something else. Now, nothing is a cause of being unless by virtue of its acting through the power of God, as we showed. THAT MAN’S FELICITY DOES NOT CONSIST IN GLORY So, it is impossible for a man to achieve this connection, in the manner suggested by them. So, nature directly intends that this existing thing be air; it does not intend that this thing should not exist as water, except as a concomitant of the fact that it is to be air. [6] Also, for this operation man is rather sufficient unto himself, in the sense that for it he needs little help from external things. It is apparent in this conclusion that good is, in a way, of wider scope than being. Now, it has been said that two principles precede the will in the order of moral actions: namely, the apprehensive power, and the object apprehended, which is the end. Now, the aforementioned knowledge which the separate substances have of God, without knowing His substance, is an imperfect species of knowledge. [13] Again, if delight were the ultimate end, it would be desired for its own sake. [7] Nor is it superfluous, even if God can by Himself produce all natural effects, for them to be produced by certain other causes. [4] Having observed these points, we should understand that not everything that is apart from intention is necessarily fortuitous or a matter of chance, as the first argument claimed. Now, we reach a proper knowledge of a thing not only through affirmations but also through negations; for instance, it is proper to a man to be a rational animal, and so it is proper to him not to be inanimate or irrational. Now, if felicity consists in perfect operation, in accord with perfect virtue, whether intellectual or moral, it is impossible for it to come to man until a long time has elapsed, And this is especially evident in speculative pursuits, in which man’s ultimate felicity is placed, as is clear from what we have said. And this is the first point on which these two opinions differ. [10] Nor is His simplicity something like that of a point, which is the terminus of a continuous line and thus has a definite position on this line, with the consequence that one point is impossible unless it A at one, indivisible place. [4] Again, the order that is established by providence among things that are governed arises from the order which the provident agent decides on within his own mind. Now, the best operation of man, according to what is proper to man, lies in a relationship to the most perfect object. Or, if the natural power adequately produces the proper effect, it is superfluous for the divine power to act for the same effect. Now, a first principle has no cause, whether direct or accidental. There is a determinate power for each natural agent, in accord with its type of nature, and failure to go beyond this power will not be a deficiency in power; such deficiency is found only when it falls short of the measure of power naturally due it. Hence, it is most important, in knowing a thing, to know what it is. And, in addition to this, man uses all sense objects for the perfection of intellectual knowledge. Hence, its first object precedes every one of its acts. But, as a matter of fact, this is so because of his own deficiency, either because handdoes not know the circumstances for the individual details, or because handis not able to think out the order for all, by virtue of the effort and length of time that might be needed. So, it could not be a form for us, unless by virtue of the fact that the objects of speculative understanding share in its action. Therefore, it is clear that Aristotle’s opinion was that the ultimate felicity which man can acquire in this life is the kind of knowledge of divine things which can be gained through the speculative sciences. Hence, Dionysius says that “the sun brings generation to visible bodies, and stimulates them to life itself, and nourishes, increases and perfects, cleanses and renews.” Therefore, to be the cause of other things is good. Therefore, this will be obtained in the final beatitude through the vision of the divine essence. But good and evil are said to be contraries. Therefore, divine knowledge is the ultimate end of man. Moreover, since the higher a substance is the more universal is its power, but the power of an intellectual substance is more universal than the power of a body, the higher intellectual substances, then, have powers incapable of functioning through bodily power, and so they are not united with bodies. For instance, we do not know anything by sight except according as it is colored. Therefore, man’s highest good does not lie in the senses. But this is not the kind of knowledge about God that the philosophers were able to get through demonstrations, because, even when we acquire this knowledge, we still desire to know other things that are not known through this knowledge. So, if to understand separate substances be a perfection of the operation of the habitual intellect, it follows that the habitual intellect understands separate substances at some point in time. Now, that is more appropriate to reason which reason has within itself than which it produces in another thing. As a consequence, then, each thing is good because it possesses actual being. [5] Furthermore, everything tends through its motion or action toward a good, as its end, which we showed above. [3] Again, what does not exist is not the cause of anything. So, the possible intellect is only in potency to those intelligible objects which are made by the agent intellect. Hence, Dionysius says, quite properly, in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names, that “evil does not fight against good, except through the power of the good; in itself, indeed, it is powerless and weak,” the principle of no action, as it were. [2] For, “everything which at one time exists, and at another does not, is measured by time,” as is clear in Physics IV [12: 221b 28]. This is so because the agent intellect’s own act of understanding is the act of understanding of ‘the man who understands through it, as was said already. [1] Created things are made like unto God by the fact that they attain to divine goodness. Therefore, celestial bodies move and dispose lower bodies. Thus it is that this intellectual knowledge is called vision. Now, every being intends a good, when it is acting, as has been proved. The next possible conclusion from this is that He governs, or rules, the whole of things by His providence. So, in practical science, he is much more perfect who directs things to act, not only universally, but also in the particular case. [4] Besides, if something act for the sake of an already existing thing, and should then set up something by its action, then this something must be added by the action of the agent to the thing for the sake of which the action is done: thus, if soldiers fight for the sake of their leader, victory will come to the leader, and this is what the soldiers cause by their actions. Hence, since the agent intellect, according to Alexander, is supposed to be an eternal separate substance, it will be impossible for the agent intellect to become the form of the habitual intellect. Now, every accidental cause reduces to a cause that works through itself. For some of them, substance is their form and their act: this is so for the creature to whom, because of what it is essentially, it is appropriate to be, and to be good. That divine providence does not entirely exclude evil from things, Chapter 72. And upon whom shall not His light arise?” (Job 25:3). But God sees His own substance most perfectly, being the only One Who comprehends it, as we showed above. So, felicity is not to be located in these pleasures. For intention is directed to an ultimate end which a person wills for its own sake, but the will may also be directed to that which a person wills for the sake of something else, even if handwould not will it simply for itself. [3] Again, as a result of knowing the effects, the desire to know their cause is aroused; thus, men began to philosophize when they investigated the causes of things.” Therefore, the desire to know, which is naturally implanted in all intellectual substances, does not rest until, after they have come to know the substances of the effects, they also know the substance of the cause. 3:20-21). Indeed, in all moral contraries, either both contraries are evil, as in the case of prodigality and illiberality, or one is good and the other evil, as in the case of liberality and illiberality. THAT FELICITY DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE OPERATION OF ART [13] Furthermore, a body tending toward its proper place by natural appetite is moved more forcibly and swiftly as it approaches its end. In another way, being means the truth in a judgment; in this meaning, privation is called a being, inasmuch as something is said to be deprived by virtue of a privation. Therefore, this position detracts from the divine power. And this will be the ultimate felicity of man, in which man will be “like some sort of God.” Therefore, man’s felicity does not lie in the aforesaid goods. [10] This is why Genesis (1:31) states: “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good”; and Ecclesiastes (3:11): “He hath made all things good in their time”; and also I Timothy (4:4): “Every creature of God is good.” Therefore, it does not pertain to divine providence to prohibit evil entirely from things. Chapter 59 For the divine essence is a certain being subsisting through itself, and we showed in Book One [26] that God cannot be a form for any other being. HUMAN FELICITY DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD WHICH IS THROUGH FAITH [1] It is obvious from what we have shown that divine providence reaches out to singulars that are generable and corruptible. Chapter 33 [4] Besides, every natural change has an end intended by nature. This is evident in an army: all divisions of an army and their functions are ordered to the commander’s good as an ultimate end, and this is victory. So, evil precisely as evil is a real thing. [8] The conclusion from these considerations is that the ultimate felicity of separate substances does not lie in the knowledge of God, in which they know Him through their substances, for their desire still leads them on toward God’s substance. Rather, the form is required so that the species may be complete. Now, the blessed are made men of renown by this vision, not according to the opinion of men, who can deceive and be deceived, but in accord with the truest knowledge, both of God and of all the blessed. Reading Summa Contra Gentiles I Summa Contra Gentiles: Book 3: providence part I - Kindle by! `` King of ages '' ( 1 Tim they act on the other of... Divine wisdom may use the thing this designation suggests that they would not cause anything of assistance... 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